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1 INTRODUCTION 
As compared to other industrial countries The Netherlands has a highly 
developed social security system. Social security contributions amount to 
almost 25% of national income, whilst transfers to households add up to a 
total of more than 30% of national income. The parallel rise of social security 
payments and unemployment in the last decades has led to the suggestion that 
the malfunctioning of the labour market, and hence the growth of unemploy- 
ment, can in some way be associated with the high degree of social security. 
However, most empirical studies, both on a macroeconomic and on a micro- 
economic level, show rather small labour market effects of social security (see 
e.g. Atkinson, 1981; Springer et al., 1988). This is particularly true for simula- 
tions by means of macroeconomic models that are typically used for policy 
analysis in The Netherlands. 
This conclusion is, however, conditional on the specification of the poIicy 
models. Dutch macroeconomic policy models, as well as many models in the 
Tinbergen tradition for other countries, can be characterized asdisequilibrium 
models and have their counterparts in the theoretical literature under the 
heading of the neo-classical Keynesian synthesis. Equilibrium models are the 
antipodes of these disequilibrium models. Minford's (1983) model for the 
labour market is a well known example of these equilibrium models. An in- 
teresting aspect of the Minford model is that it indeed shows a large impact of 
social security on the labour market (in the case of the United Kingdom and 
Germany; for the latter country see Davis and Minford, 1989). 
Against this background the present article compares the working of a 
Minfordian type of equilibrium model with the working of the traditional 
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Dutch disequilibrium policy models. The article investigates towhat extent he 
measured effects of the social security system on the labour market depend on 
the way of modelling the social security system. To that end we consider the 
working of three models for the interaction between the labour market, the 
goods market and the foreign exchange market in alternating equilibrium and 
disequilibrium conditions. Special attention is paid to the modelling of social 
security influences, viz. replacement ratios (benefit wage ratios) and social 
security contributions. The first model is an equilibrium model, and inspired 
by Minford, though quite different in elaboration. In the other two models we 
consecutively replace the specifications of the model equations which are 
typical of the equilibrium model by specifications which stem from the tradi- 
tional Dutch policy models. Therefore, the last model can be considered as a 
stylized representation f the Dutch policy models. The working of the models 
is analyzed by means of impulse simulations and by sensitivity analysis. 
The next section briefly reviews the equilibrium model and the way we have 
adapted it for The Netherlands. It goes on to describe the consecutive r place- 
ment of equilibrium conditions by disequilibrium conditions in the models. 
Moreover, this section gives a brief impression of the various equations con- 
tained in the models. Sections 3-5 illustrate the differences in the working of the 
models. Finally, section 6 summarizes the results and gives some conclusions. 
2 EQUILIBRIUM AND DISEQUILIBRIUM: THREE POLICY MODELS 
This section summarizes the characteristics of the models used for the impulse 
simulations. All models are specified on the basis of quarterly data. The 
models, called M1 to M3, have a great deal in common, but differentiate in one 
important respect at a time. Switching from the one model to the other we 
replace an equilibrium condition by a price-setting function for a pmticular 
market. Minor modifications go with it. For a formal listing of the equations 
contained in the models we refer to the annex. 
Starting point is Minford's model for labour market equilibrium in an open 
economy. This model boils down to an extended version of the classical model. 
However, nominal prices are absent in the model and no consideration is given 
to the money market. The goods market is implicitly assumed to be in 
equilibrium. The real exchange rate, as a measure of competitiveness vi -a-vis 
foreign countries, takes care of equilibrium on the current account and the real 
wage rate is the equilibrating value on the labour market. 
Minford introduces two main new features in the submodel for the labour 
market. Firstly, he distinguishes between a union and a non-union sector. 
Wages in the non-union sector are equilibrium values and union wages are 
determined by a variable mark-up on non-union wages. Secondly, the supply 
of labour is dependent upon the wage level and the benefit level, both real net 
values. When benefits are high relative to wages, implying a replacement ratio 
close to one, the effective labour supply is small and elastic. In the high wage 
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level range the effective labour supply is inelastic and approaching the 
registered working age population. 
Because the union scene in Great Britain is quite unique and seems to have 
little relevance for The Netherlands, we dismissed the distinction between a
union and a non-union sector. The remaining model of the labour market re- 
tains the Minfordian flavour as to social security but diverges from it in 
analytical treatment. 
Our equilibrium model M1 differs from Minford's orginal formulation in 
some other respects as well. Unlike Minford, we assume the nominal exchange 
rate to be exogenously determined, so that equilibrium on the current account 
is not guaranteed. For The Netherlands this assumption of exogenous ex- 
change rates is more realistic than that of flexible exchange rates, as the Dutch 
central bank wants to maintain exchange rate stability between the Dutch 
guilder and the German Mark. 
Furthermore, the goods market, modelled along Keynesian lines, is incor- 
porated into the model. Goods market equilibrium is secured by the flexibility 
of the general price level, represented by the price index of demand. The 
equilibrating forces on this market operate mainly through the real exchange 
rate. Nominal price fluctuations, coupled with a fixed nominal exchange rate, 
cause the real exchange rate to fluctuate. In case of excess demand the domestic 
price level rises, hence the real exchange rate of the own currency in terms of 
foreign currency rises. The induced fall in exports and rise in imports brings 
about a reduction in excess demand which continues until equilibrium is re- 
stored. Notwithstanding the exogenous exchange rate, M1 is rather close to 
Minford's original model. The main characteristics of this Minfordian model 
are labour market equilibrium and goods market equilibrium. 
In M2 we no longer have labour market equilibrium. Real wages do not at- 
tain their equilibrium values because nominal wages have some rigidity due to 
the wage setting processes. We do not want to dwell on the character of these 
processes, which are assumed to be part of labour market behaviour and which 
are extensively described by new-Keynesian macroeconomics. We are, how- 
ever, interested in their implications. The goods market is still considered to be 
an equilibrium market, while the nominal exchange rate is exogenous as in the 
previous model and remains o in the last model. 
In M3 we assume disequilibrium on the goods market as well as on the labour 
market. In this model there is no implicit pricing through an equilibrium condi- 
tion but explicit pricing through a price-setting function. M3 is closest o the 
models actually used in Dutch policy analysis. Our main aim is, therefore, to 
compare the working of this disequilibrium model M3 with that of the 
equilibrium model M1. The sole purpose of the intermediate model M2 is to il- 
lustrate how these differences in working between M1 and M3 can be ascribed 
to the consecutive dropping of the assumptions of labour market and goods 
market equilibria. 
The specifications of the equations of the models and the selected values of 
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their coefficients are, for a major part, based on the empirical literature. In this 
selection process the outcomes of the Dutch policy models have played a pro- 
minent part (see Den Butter, 1987). For the parameter values of the labour de- 
mand and the labour supply equations we have also used our own preliminary 
estimates of the Minford model for The Netherlands. As far as these parameter 
values are of importance for measuring the effects of social security policy, we 
have performed a sensitivity analysis. For the purpose of this article, most coef- 
ficients are deliberately not determined by estimation. Our procedure aims at 
exploiting as much as possible the empirical knowledge on the Dutch economy 
obtained in the course of time. Of course, it is rather arbitrary to select 
specifications of equations and values of coefficients from the literature. Yet, 
in our opinion such a compilation of empirical knowledge xploits much more 
information than a mere re-specification a d re-estimation of behavioural rela- 
tionships that have been extensively studied before. Moreover, experience 
shows that a re-estimation of traditional macroeconomic behavioural equa- 
tions always needs to look at other empirical evidence in order to obtain plausi- 
ble estimates. 
After the selection of the specifications of the equations and the values of the 
coefficients, the performance of the models in describing the past is tested by 
a dynamic simulation over the period 1973: 1-1986: IV. The results of these 
dynamic simulations appear to be satisfactory, albeit that the labour supply 
shows rather large expost  prediction errors. It is obvious that with respect o 
the specification of our labour supply equation more empirical effort is needed 
in order to come to versions of the models which are better calibrated to reality. 
We continue with a comment on the individual equations and start with 
labour demand.  In the models with equilibrium on the goods market (M1 and 
M2), labour demand equals full capacity labour demand. With profit max- 
imization and a Cobb-Douglas production function labour demand can be ex- 
plained by a real wage variable, the capital stock and a time trend. The speci- 
fication of this equation is as follows (for the list of symbols ee the annex). 
In a = const -0 .4  In [Wr(1 -t-tq)X -mq] +0.0 [n k+0.0025 T+0.5 In qk (1) 
Equilibrium in the labour market is brought about by w r, the real wage rate, 
earnings divided by the price index of demand. Relevant o labour demand is 
real labour cost, reason why we correct he real wage rate for social security 
contributions of employers and terms-of-trade losses. For the time being the 
capital stock has a zero coefficient. However, steady capital growth is ex- 
pressed by the time trend, which also incorporates technical progress. 
When the possibility of disequilibrium on the goods market arises in M3, a 
term for the effects of the under-utilization f capital on labour demand should 
be added to the aforementioned specification. With full utilization of capital 
(qk = 1) the influence of this term vanishes. In view of the actual abour market 
situation in The Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s we have assumed no supply 
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constraints in our modelling of labour demand in the disequilibrium odels 
and hence not used Kooiman's (1984) more sophisticated approach, according 
to which in disequilibrium actual employment is a weighted sum of effective 
labour supply and demand. 
After having explained labour demand we can determine the supply o f  goods 
or product ive capacity with the production function. 
In ynO = const + 1. O(ln a - O. 5 In q~) + (1 - 1.0) In k + O. 01 T (2a) 
This is a regular Cobb-Douglas production function, in which full capacity 
labour demand is used as labour input variable. In order to define utilization 
of capital in the case of disequilibrium on the goods market and in order to link 
productive capacity of enterprises with total demand, we need the following 
definition equations. 
ynt = (Y/Ybn) yna (2b) 
yn = 0.975 ynt (2c) 
qk = y /yn  (2d) 
As mentioned before, in the case of a goods market equilibrium, production 
always takes place at full capacity. 
qk = 1 (2e) 
Next we turn to the supply o f  labour. This labour supply equation mirrors our 
interpretation of the Minford model. In M1 with equilibrium on the labour 
market we assume that the effective labour supply (aa) is less than the 
measured labour supply (aa), the difference being determined by the height of 
net real wages and the replacement ratio. 
G = a~ (1 - const/{ [w r (1 - t~)] 2.0 [ 1 - w~/wl 3.0} ) (3a) 
The willingness to work increases with rising wages and a falling replacement 
ratio. The curvilinear specification is derived from constrained utility max- 
imization with a CES utility function in income and leisure. The total income 
of the supplier of labour is made up of wages earned by working and the (lower) 
benefits 'earned' by not-working. The supposition that the worker who volun- 
tarily chooses not to work is eligible for unemployment benefits, is a simplifica- 
tion. Effective labour supply is not registered but should, in equilibrium, be 
equal to labour demand. 
In the models with disequilibrium on the labour market (M2 and M3) 
measured labour supply instead of effective labour supply is thought o be 
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dependent upon real net wages and the replacement ratio. The decision to enter 
the labour market is at stake here. In so far as this decision is influenced by 
replacement ratios, these should be seen as indications of benefits other than on 
account of unemployment, e.g. old age, disablement, and poor relief. It is sup- 
posed that not more than 62½% of the working age population (ap) will par- 
take in the labour force. Contrary to model M1 where unemployment is 
voluntary, unemployment is involuntary in models M2 and M3. In order to 
have the models with disequilibrium on the labour market conform as much as 
possible to the equilibrium models, we have specified the disequilibrium labour 
supply equation analogous to equilibrium equation (3a) above. 
aa = 0.625 ap(1 - const/{ [wr(1 - ta)] 2.0 [1 - Wu/W] 3.0}) (3b) 
However, it should be realized that not necessarily the same mechanism is at 
work here. Moreover, the replacement ratio may not be the proper variable to 
represent the influence of participation decisions in the disequilibrium context. 
The following definition equations for unemployment, utilization rate of 
labour and labour productivity respectively, complete the disequilibrium 
modelling of the labour market. 
U= %-a-aoo  (3c) 
qL = 1 - U/aa (3d) 
ag = ag_ l Il + ¼1 Y/(a + a°°)-~Y--4/(a +a°°)-4 ]] 
Y-4/(a+~ov) 4 J )  
(3e) 
In the equations for the volume of exports and imports (all three models) we 
have both a scale variable and a relative price variable as explanatory variables. 
The scale variable, world trade for exports and national product for imports, 
has an elasticity of one. The relative price variable, expressed by the real ex- 
change rate, has a long-run elasticity of -2  towards exports and a long-run 
elasticity of 0.75 towards imports. Moreover, the volume of imports increases 
with the utilization rate of capacity. The specification of these equations is 
rather familiar. 
I nb=const+O.6 lnb_ l+ l .0 ( lnmw-O.6 lnmw_ l )+O.8 ln l /x  (4a) 
In m = const +0.6 In m_l + 1.0(ln y -0 .6  ln y_l) 
-0 .3  In l / x+ 0.4 In qk (4b) 
The specifications of the other expenditure equations are borrowed from the 
familiar Keynesian demand models as well and kept as simple as possible. 
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In c = const +0.2 In c_ 1 +0.64 ln y b 
-0.3 ln{(r+ lO0)/(/~e + 100)}_ 1 + O. 12 In m2 (Sa) 
In i = const +0.2 In i_ 1 +0.8 ln y 
- -1 .2 ln{(r+lOO)/ ( lS+lOO)}_ l+O.  12 lnm2+O.4 lnqk  (5b) 
3 
lgem _= I 2 i_j (5C) 
j=O 
iwo = (igem/igem_l)iwo_ 1 (5d) 
n = 0.005 y (5e) 
y = c+i+iwo+g+b-m+n+Yaut  (50 
Yb = Wr(l -- ta) (a + aoo) X 10 (5g) 
The volume of consumption is dependent upon disposable wage income, the 
real rate of interest and the money stock. The explanatory variables for the 
volume of fixed investments are the volume of national product, the real rate 
of interest, he money stock and the utilization rate of capital. The real money 
stock as explanatory variable in the consumption and investment functions 
represents direct money transmission and can be regarded as a proxy for real 
wealth and/or the availability of credit. Inventory formation isa fixed propor- 
tion of national income. National product is total expenditure minus imports. 
Finally, equation (5g) defines disposable income. 
Wage format ion is either implicit hrough the labour market equilibrium (in 
M1); 
with 
w~ = f (a  - 6a = 0) (6a)  
w = WrPo(1 + tq) (6b)  
or explicit through wage setting (in M2 and M3). 
with 
In w = const + 0.5 In w_l +0.5 ln po + 0.25 In qz 
+0.5 In %+0.125 ln(1 + ta) +0.425 ln(1 +tq) 
w r = w/{(1 + lq)pv } 
(6c) 
(6d) 
In the disequilibrium case, the union and the firm bargain over the wage and 
the firms decide on employment in conformity with the 'right to manage' 
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model. The variables that determine the outcome of wage negotiations are first 
of all the price index of demand and labour productivity. Furthermore, the 
wage level is linked with the utilization rate of labour (a kind of Phillips-curve 
effect) and the tax and social premiums rates. 
Price formation is somewhat analogous to wage formation. Prices are deter- 
mined either by equilibrium on the goods market (in M1 and M2); 
Po =f (Y -Yn  = O) (7a) 
or by price setting (in M3). 
with 
lnp = const+0.8 lnp_ 1 +0.12 In w+0.05 In qk 
--0.16 In ag+0.1 ln(1 + t)+0.08 ln pm 
ln pv = {1/(1 + mq)} ln p+ {mq/(1 + mq)} ll'l pm 
(7b) 
(7c) 
Price setters take account of labour costs, labour productivity, taxes, the 
utilization rate of capital and import prices. This last variable has a dual role: 
that of cost component and of competitive price. Through a definition the price 
index of national product and the price index of demand are related to each 
other (equation 7c). The nominal exchange rate and through it import prices 
measured in the domestic urrency are exogenous. The real exchange rate is 
defined as the price index of demand, relative to the index of import prices. 
x : P JPm (7 d) 
3 THE EFFECTS OF A REDUCTION IN EMPLOYERS' CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL 
SECURITY 
We will illustrate the differences in the working of the models by means of im- 
pulse simulations, representing exogenous hocks to the economy. These 
shocks are simulated by means of a permanent and autonomous change in the 
respective exogenous variables over a period of 24 quarters (6 years). The base- 
line projection is based on the values of the exogenous variables in the fourth 
quarter of 1986. The shocks are presumed to occur in the first quarter of the 
simulation period. The effects of the impulses are measured as differences 
from the baseline projections. In each behavioural equation the constant term 
is set equal to its mean value in the reference period, given the selected values 
of the coefficients. This procedure implies that the baseline projections are not 
identical for all models. However, the influence of the differences between 
baseline projections on the computation of the impulse response ffects ap- 
pears to be small. 
This section investigates how, according to the models, the economy reacts 
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to a permanent reduction by 5 percentage-points in the incidence of social 
security contributions paid by employers. The increase of the public sector 
deficit induced by this reduction is assumed to be financed on the capital 
market, but does not affect the interest rate due to the openness of the Dutch 
economy. As the simulation results in Table 1 show, the reaction on the reduc- 
tion of social security contributions varies from model to model. 
In the Minfordian equilibrium model (M1) the simulated reduction of the 
employers' ocial security contributions results in an increase in national prod- 
uct and employment of less than 1%. Equilibrium on the labour market is 
maintained by a rise in the real wage rate (i. e. earnings) so that the advantage 
of the lower contributions i partly passed on to the workers. In order to main- 
tain equilibrium on the goods market he price level, and through it the real ex- 
change rate, show a slight decline as compared to the baseline level. 
In model M2 with wage setting on the labour market and equilibrium prices 
on the goods market, a reduction in social premiums paid by employers leads 
in the long run to a more moderate rise of the real wage rate than in the 
equilibrium labour market model. On the other hand, the increase in real wages 
in the first quarter is much higher in M2 than in M1. As in the equilibrium 
model, the fall of real labour costs increases the demand for labour and the 
supply of goods, which now leads to long-run effects of just over 1%. Thus, in 
conformity with the Minfordian model, lowering social security premiums paid 
by employers has, under the assumption of labour market disequilibrium com- 
bined with goods market equilibrium, a positive effect on the national product 
and employment. 
In M3 the possibility of disequilibrium on the goods market is introduced. In 
fact, we have under-utilization of capital during the simulation period. A1- 
TABLE 1 - THE EFFECTS OF A REDUCTION IN THE EMPLOYERS' WAGE TAXA- 
TION RATE BY 5-PERCENTAGE POINTS 
(in %of  the baseline projection, unless stated otherwise) 
effects on 
according to M1 M2 M3 
labour market is in equilibrium disequilibrium disequilibrium 
goods market is in equilibrium equilibrium disequilibrium 
effects after lqu lyr 6yr lqu lyr 6yr lqu lyr 6yr 
Volume of income (y) 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.2 2.7 
Volume of exports (b) 0.6 0.4 0.4 -0.1 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.9 3.9 
Volume of imports (m) 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 3.9 
Expenditure price level (Po) -0.9 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.7 -1.9 
Real wage level (wr) 1.4 1.8 1.9 2.4 1.3 1.2 2.5 1.4 2.6 
Real exchange rate (x) -0.9 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.7 -1.9 
Demand for labour (a) 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.1 0.7 1.0 1.5 
Unemployment (U) - -8 -29 -34 -3 -27 -40 
(in labour years × 1000) 
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though M3 shows only slightly stronger employment effects than M2, it does 
have much more favourable long-run effects in terms of national product and 
real wages. In M3 the price fall due to lower labour costs is sharper than in M2 
at the end of the simulation period. Consequently, the demand for goods rises 
relative to their supply and the utilization rate of capital increases. In accord- 
ance with Okun's law the increase in national product will surpass the increase 
in employment. 
Summarizing Table 1, it appears that the stronger the disequilibrium charac- 
ter of the model, the more we can rely on the positive effects of reducing em- 
ployers' contributions to social security. The results of a sensitivity analysis not 
reported here reveal that this conclusion is somewhat dependent on the real 
wage elasticity of labour demand, which, in the central variant, is set to a value 
of -0 .4  (see equation 1). The equilibrium model appears to be much more sen- 
sitive to a change in the wage elasticity of labour demand than the disequilib- 
rium model. Therefore, the differences in effects between the equilibrium and 
disequilibrium odel become more marked in the case of low wage elasticities 
of labour demand. 
4 THE EFFECTS OF A REDUCTION IN EMPLOYEES' CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL 
SECURITY 
This section analyses the effects of a once and for all reduction of wage taxes 
and employees' contributions to social security (hereafter wage taxation rate) 
by 5 percentage-points. The results are shown in Table 2. We again make the 
implicit assumption of capital market financing of the increased public sector 
deficit. 
TABLE 2 - THE EFFECTS OF A REDUCTION IN THE EMPLOYEES' WAGE TAXA- 
TION RATE BY 5 PERCENTAGE-POINTS 
(in % of the baseline projection, unless stated otherwise) 
effects on 
according to M 1 M 2 M 3 
labour market is in equilibrium disequilibrium disequilibrium 
goods market is in equilibrium equilibrium disequilibrium 
effects after lqu lyr 6yr lqu lyr 6yr lqu lyr 6yr 
Volume of income (y) 
Volume of exports (b) 
Volume of imports (m) 
Expenditure price level (Pv) 
Real wage level (Wr) 
Real exchange rate (x) 
Demand for labour (a) 
Unemployment (U) 
(in labour years x 1000) 
1.4 1.5 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.5 1.7 2.2 2.8 
1.2 0.6 0.7 -1 .2 -2 .3  -2.4 0.0 0.3 1.6 
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.6 2.3 3.8 5.5 
-1 .5 -0 .2 -0 .5  1.6 1.2 1.2 -0 .1 -0 .3 -0 .8  
-4 .4 -3 .7 -3 .7  -1 .2 -0 .9 -0 .8  -0.4 0.0 1.0 
-1 .5 -0 .2 -0 .5  1.6 1.2 1.2 -0 .1 -0 .3 -0 .8  
1.5 1.5 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.1 
- - - 6 14  4 23 15 -3  
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In the equilibrium model M 1 a reduction in the wage taxation rate stimulates 
the effective labour supply. This supply shift forces the real wage rate down 
and evokes an increase of labour demand and hence of employment and na- 
tional product. These effects are rather substantial and amount o 1.4%. The 
transmission of this impulse is somewhat complicated. The reduction in the 
wage taxation rate is not fully translated into an equal decrease of (gross) real 
wages and therefore causes a rise in disposable income, which forces up de- 
mand. However, as this rise in demand is still smaller than the resulting rise in 
supply, the assumption of equilibrium on the goods market leads to lower 
prices and hence to a fall in the real exchange rate. Therefore the volume of ex- 
ports increases, whilst the volume of imports also increases due to the rise in 
demand. 
In the models with disequilibrium on the labour market a reduction in the 
wage taxation rate increases the registered labour supply instead of the effec- 
tive labour supply. Because of the assumption of equilibrium on the goods 
market in M2, the same mechanism with respect to the price level and foreign 
trade is at work as in M1, although we see contrary effects. Because real wages 
in this model are no longer instrumental in clearing the labour market, they 
now only show a modest decline in response to a reduction in the wage taxation 
rate. Hence, the resulting rise in disposable income and demand is much larger 
in M2 than in M1. In M2 the rise in demand is not matched by an equal rise in 
supply, so that domestic prices, which clear the goods market, increase. That 
is why, according to this simulation, the real exchange rate increases and why 
the volume of exports falls. For that reason the positive effects of a reduction 
in the wage taxation rate on national product and employment are much more 
moderate in M2 than in M1. 
Relaxation of the assumption of equilibrium on the goods market leads, like 
in M1, to a decline in the domestic price level and hence to an equal enhance- 
ment of the competitive position. This is illustrated by the simulation results 
for M3 in Table 2. The resulting rise in exports, combined with the demand 
push due to the fact that the reduction in the wage taxation rate is now fully 
translated into more disposable income, leads to a considerable increase of the 
national product as compared to the models with equilibrium on the goods 
market. Because labour supply rises along with labour demand in models M2 
and M3, the change in unemployment is relatively small as compared to that in 
employment. 
The value of the wage coefficient of labour supply in the central variant is set 
at 2 (see equations 3a and 3b), amounting to an elasticity of about 0.4. Sen- 
sitivity analysis tells us that varying this coefficient value affects the working of 
the Minfordian equilibrium model M 1 quite substantially. On the other hand, 
the change in effect in the disequilibrium odel M3 is negligible. Hence a good 
measurement of the wage elasticity of the labour supply is essential for equilib- 
rium models but far less so for the usual Dutch policy models which assume 
disequilibrium on the labour and goods markets. 
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A more feasible policy measure than a simple reduction in the employers' or 
employees' contributions to social security would be a 'balanced budget' sub- 
stitution of the employers' contributions to employees' contributions (or vice 
versa). In that case no implicit assumptions on public debt financing are need- 
ed. Table 3 shows the effects of such a combined impulse, entailing ashift from 
the one category to the other with 5 percentage-points. A  the models appear 
to be almost linear in this respect, this impulse can be interpreted as the out- 
comes of Table 1 subtracted from those of Table 2. Our simulations indicate 
that shifting social security contributions from employers to employees i un- 
favourable for employment and national income according to the equilibrium 
model. With respect to (un)employment the models with disequilibrium on the 
labour market, on the contrary, show favourable long-run effects. However, 
these effects are not very substantial and largely depend upon the wage 
elasticities of the labour supply and demand in our models, and upon the in- 
cidence of the respective social security contributions. 
5 THE EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN THE BENEFIT WAGE RATIO 
In this section we compare the different models as to their reaction to a reduc- 
tion in the benefit wage ratio by 5 percentage-points. The results in Table 4 
show that in the equilibrium model M1 the effects on national product and 
employment are very substantial. The curtailment of benefits increases the ef- 
fective labour supply. The real wage rate falls in order to secure labour market 
equilibrium. Consequently, employment and national product end up at a 
higher level. Moreover, the clearing prices on the goods market are much below 
TABLE 3 - THE EFFECTS OF A SHIFT FROM THE EMPLOYERS' WAGE TAXATION 
RATE TO THAT OF THE EXPLOYEES' BY 5 PERCENTAGE-POINTS 
(in % of the baseline projection, unless stated otherwise) 
effects on 
according to M1 M2 M3 
labour market is in equilibrium disequilibrium disequilibrium 
goods market is in equilibrium equilibrium disequilibrium 
effects after lqu lyr 6yr lqu lyr 6yr lqu lyr 6yr 
Volume of income (y) -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.2 0.3 0.3 -1.0 -1.1 -0.2 
Volume of exports (b) -0.6 -0.3 -0.4 1.3 2.9 3.0 0.1 0.5 2.1 
Volume of imports (m) -0.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -1.5 -3.0 -2.2 
Expenditure price level (Po) 0.7 0.3 0.2 -1.5 -1.7 -1.5 -0.1 -0.3 -1.1 
Real wage level(wr) 6.5 6.1 6.1 3.7 2.3 2.2 2.9 1.4 1.2 
Real exchange rate (x) 0.7 0.3 0.2 -1.5 -1.7 -1.5 -0.1 -0.3 -1.1 
Demand for labour (a) -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.2 0.3 0.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.3 
Unemployment (U) . . . .  19 -52 -39 -35 -50 -46 
(in labour years × 1000) 
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the baseline level, so that the enhanced competitive position leads to a strong 
growth of the export volume. 
Contrary to what we noticed in the two previous ections, in this section the 
disequilibrium odels M2 and M3 show much smaller effects than the equilib- 
rium model. In the disequilibrium labour market models a negative benefits im- 
pulse is also transmitted via the labour market. A reduction of the benefit wage 
ratio increases the registered labour supply. The falling utilization rate of labour 
exerts a downward pressure on the real wage rate (Phillips-curve ffect), which 
is insufficient o eliminate the labour market imbalance. Because of this wage 
rigidity the disequilibrium labour market models are far less responsive to a 
benefit wage reduction than the equilibrium model. The resulting rise in na- 
tional product and employment appears to be relatively small. As the increase 
in the labour supply is much larger than that in labour demand, the reduction 
of the benefit wage ratio leads, according to the disequilibrium odels, to a con- 
siderable rise in registered unemployment. We note, however, that the magni- 
tude of this rise in unemployment may be exaggerated, ue to the fact that we 
have used similar labour supply specifications in the equilibrium and disequili- 
brium models. Finally, Table 4 shows that with respect o this impulse the dif- 
ferences in working between the disequilibrium odels are remarkably small. 
We do not present he results of the sensitivity analysis with regard to the 
coefficient of one minus the replacement ratio in the labour supply equation 
(equations 3a and 3b), which is given the value of 3 in the central variant, but 
report he main conclusion drawn from it. The outcomes of the impulse simula- 
tions appear to depend upon the value of this coefficient only in the equilib- 
rium model. Hence, in case this type of model is to be used in policy analysis, 
some empirical attention must be paid to obtaining good estimates of this 
TABLE 4 - THE EFFECTS OF A REDUCTION IN THE BENEFIT WAGE RATIO BY 5 
PERCENTAGE-POINTS 
(in °/0 of the baseline projection, unless stated otherwise) 
according to M1 
labour market is in equilibrium 
goods market is in equilibrium 
effects on effects after 1 qu 1 yr 
M2 M3 
disequilibrium disequilibrium 
equilibrium disequilibrium 
6yr lqu lyr 6yr lqu lyr 6yr 
Volume of income (y) 5.4 
Volume of exports (b) 12.7 
Volume of imports (m) 0.9 
Expenditure price level (Pv) -13.9 
Real wage level (Wr) -19.7 
Real exchange rate (x) -13.9 
Demand for labour (a) 5.5 
Unemployment (U) 
(in labour years x 1000) 
6.0 5.9 0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.0 0.5 
12.7 11.0 0.3 1.0 0.7 0.1 0.4 1.2 
1.3 1.9 -0 .0 -0 .0  0.0 -0 .3 -0 .8  0.2 
-5.6 -5.0 -0 .4 -0 .6 -0 .3  -0 .1 -0 .3 -0 .6  
-16.3-15.9 -0 .5 -1 .2 -0 .7  -0 .9 -1 .6 -0 .8  
-5.6 -5.0 -0.4 -0 .6 -0 .3  -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 
5.9 5.9 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 
- 161 152 99 212 181 106 
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parameter. Reliable estimates of this parameter are absent until now, at least in 
The Netherlands. Yet the simulations of this section show that, if the viability 
of a policy of reducing the replacement ratio in order to increase mployment 
is at stake, the question whether equilibrium or disequilibrium odelling is ap- 
propriate carries much more weight han a good measurement of the influence 
of the replacement ratio on labour supply. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this article is twofold. Firstly, it investigates the influence of alter- 
native policy measures with respect to social security on economic activity and 
on the labour market, using stylized empirical macroeconomic models for The 
Netherlands. Secondly, it analyses the consequences of disequilibrium versus 
equilibrium modelling of the labour and goods markets for the working of the 
models. 
The main conclusion from our exercises are as follows: 
1. In the equilibrium model, the policy effects depend to a large extent on the 
wage elasticity of the labour supply. 
2. Reduction of the incidence of taxes and social security contributions i
about equally effective, according to both the equilibrium and the disequilib- 
rium models. However, in case of an inelastic labour supply this policy is very 
ineffective according to the equilibrium model, whereas its effectiveness does 
not alter very much according to the disequilibrium odels. 
3. Reduction of the replacement ratio is much more effective according to the 
equilibrium model than according to the disequilibrium odels. 
Hence the question of the effectiveness of social security policy in increasing 
economic activity and employment appears to be closely related to the way in 
which the labour market and the goods market are modelled. Where an equi- 
librium model is appropriate, a reduction in the replacement ratio is most effec- 
tive; whereas in case the labour and goods markets are supposed to be in dis- 
equilibrium, a reduction in social security contributions i  to be preferred. Un- 
fortunately, the poor informational content of macroeconomic data will never 
allow us to discriminate between equilibrium and disequilibrium odels using 
econometric methodology. Therefore the choice between equilibrium and dis- 
equilibrium models has to be based partly on judgement and on theoretical 
considerations. Empirical microeconomics and institutional knowledge may be 
helpful in assessing such judgement. In The Netherlands there are indications 
of serious labour market rigidities, so that from that point of view disequilib- 
rium modelling seems relevant. Moreover, modern microeconomic theory can 
explain the existence of labour market rigidities very well. For that reason 
theoretical rguments no longer automatically lead to a preference for equilib- 
rium models from a normative point of view. 
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ANNEX 
A MODELS 
MI: (1) + (2a) + (2b) + (2c) + (2e) + (3a) + (4) + (5) + (6a) + (6b) + (7a) + 
(7d) 
(equilibrium odel) 
M2: (1) + (2a) + (2b) + (2c) + (2e) + (3b) + (3c) + (3d) + (3e) + (4) + (5) + 
(6c) + (6d) + (7a) + (7d) 
(intermediate model: disequilibrium on labour market, equilibrium 
on goods market) 
M3: (1) + (2a) + (2b) + (2c) + (2d) + (3b) + (3c) + (3d) + (3e) + (4) + (5) + 
(6c) + (6d) + (7b) + (7c) + (7d) 
(disequilibrium on labour and goods market) 
B LIST OF SYMBOLS 
a 
aa 
da 
ag 
aov 
ap 
b 
¢ 
g 
i 
[wo 
k 
m 
mw 
m2 
mq 
n 
P 
pe 
Pm 
Po 
qk 
qL 
F 
T 
t 
labour demand by enterprises 
measured labour supply 
effective labour supply 
labour productivity 
labour demand by government (#) 
working age population (#) 
volume of exports 
volume of private consumption 
volume of government expenditure (#) 
volume of gross fixed investments (enterprises) 
volume of gross investments in dwellings 
volume of capital stock (#) 
volume of imports 
world trade index (1977 = 100) (#) 
volume of broadly defined money stock (#) 
ratio of imports to income (#) 
volume of stockbuilding 
price index of gross national product (1977 = 1) 
inflationary expectations (#) 
index of import prices (1977 = 1) (#) 
price index of demand 
utilization rate of capital stock 
utilization rate of labour 
(long term) interest rate (#) 
time trends (#) 
burden of taxation (#) 
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t~ 
tq 
U 
w 
W r 
Wu/W 
X 
Y 
Yaut 
Yb 
Y/Ybn 
yn 
ynb 
ynt 
wage taxes and employees' social security contributions (as % of 
earnings) (#) 
employers' social security contributions (as % of earnings) (#) 
unemployment 
nominal wage rate (including employers' social security contribu- 
tions) 
real wage rate (earnings) 
replacement ratio (#) 
real exchange rate 
volume of (gross) national product 
autonomous part of volume of (gross) national product (#) 
disposable wage income 
ratio of national product and production by enterprises (#) 
structural or natural level of income 
productive capacity of enterprises 
total productive capacity 
Explanatory note: # indicates variables which are exogenous in all models. 
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Summary 
LABOUR MARKET EFFECTS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN 
THE NETHERLANDS 
The elements of the social security system, such as unemployment benefits, minimum wages and 
contributions by employers and employees, may affect both labour demand and labour supply in 
various ways. This article investigates to what extent he measured effects of the social security 
system on the labour market depend on the way of modelling the social security system. Starting 
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point of the analysis is the well known Minford model, modified and adapted to the Dutch situa- 
tion. The model assumes equilibrium on the labour and goods markets. However, policy analysis 
in The Netherlands i traditionally based on disequilibrium odelling of the labour and goods 
markets. This article analyses the differences in the working of these models. It is shown that the 
assumptions that both the labour market and goods markets clear in each period, which in Minford's 
model implicitly determines the wage and price level, have a major influence on the model's 
measurement of the impact of social security policy. 
